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Guest Editorial ...

Ethical Issues in Community and
Research Medicine
The following guest editorial by
Saltonstall Professor of Population
Ethics, Arthur J. Dyck, is reprinted
from the New England Journal of
Medicine. In it reference is made to an
article, "Ethics of a Cottage Industry
in an Age of Community and Research
Medicine, " by Paul Ramsey, professor
of Christian Ethics at Princeton. Professor Ramsey's article appeared in the
same issue, April 1, 1971, of the New
England Journal of Medicine, pages
700-706.

R eprinted with permission from the
New England Journal of Medicine.

by
Arthur J. Oyck
Ramsey's essay in this issue of the

Journal identifies two broad areas in
which serious ethical issues arise for
the practice of medicine - namely,
community medicine and medical research. His excellent discussion of
these issues suggests that when medicine attempts to make judgments
about social well-being and when its
practitioners become increasingly dedicated to the advancement of science,
important questions must be raised
regarding the role , warrant and
principles of medical practice. What
tasks and what judgments accrue to
physicians as physicians? What are
they trained to do and what ought
they to be trained to do? By what
primary principles and modes of ethical reasoning is and ought their practice to be governed? Let us briefly
examine a specific instance in which
current medical practice is involved
sometimes implicitly , sometimes exconflicting ways of
plicitly, in
answering these questions.
In a recent series of articles in the

Journal, Milunsky et aLl review the
Arthur J. Dyck is Salton stall Professor of PopUlation Ethics at Harvard
School of Public Health and a faculty
member of the Harvard Divinity
School.
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curren t state of prenatal genetic diagnosis and argue for the widespread use
of amniocentesis. As they use the
term, amniocentesis refers to the aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac
for the purpose of making cytogenetic
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studies. The immediate rationale for
this use of amniocentesis is to advance
the practice of genetic counseling by
basing predictions of an increasing
number of diseases upon actual diagnoses in utero instead of ca lculated
probauility risKs. The advantages that
they cite for this more accurate counsel is that it reassures couples regarding
the nonnality of the fetus , it permits
the decision to intervene thro ugh abortion where abnonnalities are detected,
and it provides a way of preventing the
births of infants with irreparable genetic defects an d fatal genetic diseases.
Milunsky and his co-workers recognize
tha t this last use of amniocentesi s
changes the traditional role of the
physician so far as he can now predict
diseases accurately before birth and
provide the means of preventing the
birth of a child with mental defects or
fatal diseases. Hence , we enter a new
era of social and preventive medicine.
Throughout the discussion of the
diagnostic use of amniocentesis as advocated by Milunsky et a!., there is no
explicit recognition of the fetus as a
patient. Apparently, genetic counelin g does not include the task of
preparing a family to accept and care
for a defect ive child. "Therapy" at the
present time is aimed at the family and
not the fetus . I n an earlier essay, John
W. Littlefield spoke specifically to this
issue:
Prena tal genetic diagnosis will co nst itute a major medical advance only if
therapy can be given once a diagnosis is
made. Eventually and occasionally, this
may be prenata l tberapy for the fetus . ..
But society and the professions mllst
appreciate and accept that the proper
th erapy now is for the family. and at
times that means abortion. 2

Clea rly , neither reassurance for the
family nor abo rtion provides therapy
for the fetus . The hope is held ou t for
eventua l and occasional therapy for
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the fetus, with no explicit reference to
the kinds of postnatal therapy present ly available. For now, the treatment of the diseases of this "sometime
patient" is, in this view, achieved by
its elimination as a patien t and as a
hving entity.
Suppose a physician argues that
deciding whether to treat the fetus as a
patient is a judgment that a physician
as physician is not in a position to
make. In effect, this is the view taken
by Milunsky et a!. when they suggest
that physicians and society are, and
shou ld remain, impartial or neutral
regarding decisions by fami lies about
whether to use amniocentesis and
whether to abort the fetus where
deformities are detected. This point of
view is strange considerin g both the
traditional ro le of physicians and cu rrent medical practice.
As the physicians' role was traditionally depicted in the Hippocratic
Oath and many subsequent codes, he
was expected to be the physician
advocate of both the pregnant woman
and developing life within the womb.
If, as Milunsky et al. suggest, both
physician and society should be impartial regarding the use of amnioce ntesis
to prevent diseases by elimin at ing the
di seased, what advocate is left for
defenseless life? Are physicians about
to abandon also their time-honored
role as advocates on behalf of the
hopelessly ill , the unconsc ious and the
experimental subject who is uninformed? And even if one wishes to
leave the exact status of the fet us as a
human life an open question , sho uld it
not be part of the specia l responsi bility of the phy sician, as it certainly
has been traditionally , to err on the
side of saving and fostering human life
rather th an to develop or enco urage
programs that se lective ly prevent such
life?
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To drop the fetus as a patient at
this time in history is also incongruous
with the aims and increasing accomplishments of contemporary fetology.
Furthermore, why should physicians
claim increasing responsibility for defining and specifying the end of
human life, and decreasing responsibility for defining and specifying the
beginning of human life? Why, for
example, should the absence of signs
of brain activity spell death wh ile signs
of brain activity in the eight-week-old
fetus are largely unheralded as signs of
human life? If physicians nevertheless
insist that specifying when human life
begins is not a medical decision, by
what warrant do they decide that the
fetus is not a patient and that his life is
dispensable? As Ramsey has indicated,
the medical warrant for recommending
abortion occurs only when a fetus
threatens the life or the health of a
pregnant woman.
To decide that a given set of
diseases is to be eliminated by
elimination of the diseased is one of
the principles on wh ich programs of
eugenics and eu thanasia rest. Decisions
of this kind are surely not morally
neu tral. What special competence does
a physician have to decidc that a
society ought to prefer death to giving
custodial or remedial care for those
who require it? Milunsky et al. cite the
costs of care for the mentally retarded
in Massachusetts. What a meager sum
this is as compared to the amount of
money being spent for destroying lives
in Vietnam! If saving money is importan t, why not save much more
money and save lives as well by
thinking of other costs that could be
cut? One of the problems here is that,
as the physicians strive to contribute
to social well-being, they find that
only certain kinds of actions are predictably within their power as physi-
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cians. Hence, they look to the surest
way in which they can affect social
policy. Their warrant for doing so is
very unclear, and, whereas we can vote
out those who might suggest legislation that permits or encourages selective killing, including capital punishment and the like, our recourse in
forming the conscience of physicians is
less certain. Heretofore, in the area of
abortion , we have generally pu t constraints upon physicians and others on
behalf of the fetus. The assumption
that the use and application of
amn iocentesis is a neutral sphere for
physicians and society presupposes
tha t, for physicians and society,
abortion is not a moral issue , and that
existing or fu ture laws do or will
assure that abortions are decided
solely by families and physicians. To
go that way is not morally neutral , and
it is not life affirming.
Like so many technical innovations,
amniocentesis is a powerful tool in
search of a noble purpose. On the
whole, medicine has exhibited a remarkable degree of compassion for the
ill whatever their condition, agressive
zest in affirming , extending and enhancing life, and loyalty to the welfare
of individual patients whatevcr their
presumable social utility. The use of
amniocentesis is surely to be judged by
these principles, for if it is not , it
threatens to erode them.
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